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First-Round Impacts 
of the 2008 Chilean Pension System Reform 
 
Jere R. Behrman, Maria Cecilia Calderon, Olivia S. Mitchell,  
Javiera Vasquez and David Bravo 
 
 
Systematic research on the effects of alternative pension systems is useful to enhance the 
scientific basis for policy evaluation in the retirement arena. One of the most interesting, perhaps 
the most interesting, country in this regard has been Chile, which since 1981 has become a 
laboratory for observing the impacts of pension privatization. Specifically, for 30 years Chile has 
had mandatory individual retirement accounts managed by private-sector providers known as 
Pension Fund Managers (AFPs, Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones). Formal-sector 
workers are required to save an annual 10 percent of their pay in their accounts, which offer 
some investment choice, and wherein they must preserve the funds until they reach retirement 
age.  
Though the Chilean AFP system has numerous strengths, it has also been cited for paying 
low benefit levels and for having low rates of worker contributions (Berstein et al. 2006; Gill et 
al. 2005; Kritzer et al. 2011). Accordingly, in July 2008, the government of President Michelle 
Bachelet initiated several system-wide reforms intended to strengthen the national safety net for 
both the young and the old (Diaz et al. 2009). This paper evaluates how one key element of the 
2008 Chilean reform, namely the Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS, Pension Básica Solidaria), 
influenced economic outcomes for targeted poor households with at least one member age 65 or 
older. We do so using the 2006 and 2009 Chilean Social Protection Surveys (EPS, Encuesta de 
Proteccion Social) and linked information from administrative data about the respondents to 
investigate resulting changes in knowledge of and receipt of these new transfers as well as 
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changes in outcomes such as household work and health status and expenditures on alcohol and 
cigarette consumption, health insurance, and ownership of consumer durables.1
 
 We address a 
wide range of outcomes because we posit that, as in standard economic household models, the 
reforms may have influenced behaviors in unanticipated or even undesirable ways from the 
policy perspective. Results indicate that targeted households with elderly individuals received 
about 2.4 percent more household annual income, with little evidence of crowding-out private 
transfers. We also suggest that recipient household welfare probably increased due to slightly 
higher expenditures on basic consumption including healthcare, more leisure hours, and 
improved self-reported health. While measured short-run effects are small, follow-ups will be 
essential to gauge longer-run behaviors. 
Background 
Chile’s privately managed pension system has inspired reform in many other countries 
and is considered by some as a possible prototype for reform in the United States and elsewhere 
(Arenas de Mesa 2005; Arenas de Mesa et al. 2007; and Barr and Diamond, 2008). Accordingly, 
in 2008 when the government launched a series of reforms, this aroused substantial international 
interest (Arenas de Mesa 2010; Kritzer 2008; Packard 2002; and Valdes-Prieto 2009). These 
changes were driven in part by the fact that many workers did not contribute much to the system; 
also benefit levels were projected to be low for those who failed to contribute at least 20 years 
and hence would be ineligible for a guaranteed minimum pension benefit.  
The new safety net as implemented includes two big components: a) the Basic Solidarity 
Pension (PBS, Pension Básica Solidaria) mentioned above, that secures a minimum means-
tested benefit for the elderly poor (age 65+) who do not satisfy minimum contribution 
                                                          
1 For further discussion of the EPS see Bravo et al. (2004, 2006) and Centro de Microdatos (2009). 
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requirements, and b) a pension top-up (APS, Aporte Previsional Solidario) that increases pension 
benefits for those who did contribute to the AFP system. In 2008, the PBS was set at 
US$105/month or about one-third of the minimum monthly wage of US$333, higher than the 
Minimum Pension Guarantee of US$187/month (Kritzer 2008). The PBS benefit withdrawal rate 
is 100 percent for households with income above the governmental poverty threshold (Valdes-
Prieto 2009). The PBS was initially targeted at the poorest 40 percent of the population; coverage 
is set to rise gradually to 60 percent by 2012.2 In what follows, we use difference-in-difference 
analysis to examine the short-run impacts of the PBS targeted towards poor households with at 
least one member age 65+.3
Old-Age ‘Basic Solidarity Pension’: the old-age Basic Solidarity Pension is a monthly benefit 
paid by the Chilean Government to those who (a) receive no other pension, (b) are age 65+, and 
(c) are deemed to be in the poorest half of the population according to their poverty score 
(measured as a “Ficha de Proteccion Social” score of 12,666 points or below).
 
4
                                                          
2 Several other reforms were also instituted though they are not the focus here. The self-employed are now to be 
required to contribute to the individual accounts system with a phase-in; in 2012, their contribution rate will be 10 
percent on 40 percent of their pay, and by 2015, their entire pay will be subject to the 10 percent contribution rate. 
Additionally, low-wage workers (those earning less than 1.5 times the minimum wage) are to receive a contribution 
subsidy by employers and the government. Survivor and disability insurance is being extended to working men and 
women to age 65 (before, women were covered only to age 60), and since women average lower disability rates, 
they will receive a refund of the excess charges into their individual account pensions. A benefit subsidy is to be 
paid to mothers age 65 or above who retire from 2009 on and who contributed at least once to an AFP and are in 
receipt of a solidarity or survivors pension. This benefit is computed as a per-child bond that earns a return from 
each child’s birthdate until the mother reaches age 65. Finally, assets accumulated in workers’ individual accounts 
are now divisible on divorce (which was only recently legalized in Chile), and both widows and widowers are now 
eligible for survivor pensions (previously only widows received the survivor benefit). 
 This benefit has 
been rolling-out gradually since July 2008 because it represents a large boost in poverty 
3 More time must pass to measure the medium and longer-run impacts of the 2008 provisions. An alternative 
approach to that used in this paper would be to develop and estimate a structural life cycle model that could be used 
to stimulate counterfactuals under the pension reforms of 2008. A few authors have developed such formulations, 
but they have not used them to study the 2008 reform (Joubert 2010; Vélez-Grajales 2009).  
4 During the first two years 2008-2010, the FPS score was used to assign the PBS benefit; however, since July 2010 
the law establishes the use of a new tool called Puntaje de Focalizacion Previsional (PFP). This new instrument 
uses the same information captured by the FPS score but in a different way; giving relevance to the information that 
appears more related to the pension situation. A PFP score of 1,100 or lower was required for the period between 
July 2010 and June 2011 to be eligible for the PBS benefit.  
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payments. At that time, the benefit was worth US$105/month and the program aimed to reach 
the poorest 40 percent of the population. By July 2009, the amount had risen to US$132/month, 
and coverage was targeted to the poorest 45 percent of the population; the coverage target rose to 
50 percent by September 2009, 55 percent by July 2010 and 60 percent as of July 2011, a year 
before the planned schedule.5
 
 Benefits are paid both by the government Social Security 
administration (IPS, Instituto de Previsión Social, formerly the INP), local municipalities, and 
the AFPs. To date, the IPS is the main distributor with half a million applications, whereas the 
AFPs have registered only about 30,000 applications. 
Data Overview 
To analyze the near-term impact of the reform we rely on the EPS, which is a panel 
survey collected by the Microdata Center of the Universidad de Chile with guidance from a 
University of Pennsylvania research team.6 The sample is drawn from a frame of approximately 
8.1 million current and former affiliates of the Chilean old-age systems compiled from 
administrative sources. For this study, we focus on a research file of 10,394 individuals for 
whom all key dependent variables are available from both the 2006 and 2009 EPSs7 to ensure 
that the multiple outcomes traced over time track changes in responses rather than changes in 
sample coverage.8
                                                          
5 http://www.safp.cl/573/article-5785.html 
 
6 Research support was provided by a U.S. National Institutes of Aging (NIA) grant on which three senior co-
authors are Co-Investigators to supplement resources provided by the Chilean government. 
7 The total number of respondents was 16,443 in the 2006 EPS and 14,243 in the 2009 EPS. For some dependent 
variables, sample sizes are smaller. For instance, hours worked are available only for those in the labor force and 
who report hours worked (5,980 individuals); per capita household expenditures on clothing are available for 10,099 
observations; per capita household medical expenditures are available for 9,735; and purchases of private medical 
insurance are available for 9,737 persons; and for a set of a dozen consumer durables we have between 10,388 and 
10,394 responses. 
8 We also note below that results are similar if we consider the largest possible sample for each dependent variable 
rather than the sample available for all outcomes. 
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Descriptive statistics for demographic and other factors appear in Table 1. Respondents’ 
average age is 49.7 years (sd=14.9) and average schooling attainment is 9.8 grades (sd=4.3), 
reflective of the fact that Chile has a relatively highly-schooled population for a developing 
country. The sample is almost half male (48.5 percent), and mean household size is 3.9 members 
(sd=1.9). Almost a third (32 percent) of the households report having a member age 65+. The 
mean age of the household head is older, at 53.8 years (sd=14.6), and schooling attainment 
slightly lower, at 9.3 grades (sd=4.4), compared to all EPS respondents. But where there is a 
large difference between respondents and household heads is with respect to sex, with about 
three-quarters (72.9 percent) of household heads being male. Mean annual household income 
(expressed in constant 2009 terms) is US$9,650 (sd=US$14,100), which implies a mean per 
capita annual household income of US$2,990 (sd=US$4,475).9 Finally, over half (52.7 percent) 
of the households have Ficha de Proteccion Social (FPS) scores below the poverty cutoff used to 
establish eligibility for the reform’s means test.10
Table 1 here 
 The FPS score was provided from 
administrative data matched to the EPS respondents, so the FPS values used in the multivariate 
analysis below are the official scores and not self-reported. 
To examine the first-round impact of the reform, we examine three sets of outcomes. The 
first set, shown in Table 2, includes seven variables related to respondent knowledge of the 
reform and reports of PASIS/PBS11 benefit receipt in 2009.12
                                                          
9 In 2009, the exchange rate between Chilean pesos (CLP) and the US dollar was 569.37 (CIA World Factbook, 
 Only about one-quarter (25.9 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html, accessed 28 August 2010). Household 
income is missing for one-fifth of the households.   
10 Some 15.1 percent have FPS scores above the eligibility cutoff, about 31.1 percent have no FPS scores and we 
lack of information for whether or not 1.1 percent of households have a score. A natural interpretation is that 
respondents lacking an FPS scores were likely ineligible. 
11 Before the reform was implemented in July 2008, some in the targeted population received the PASIS benefit 
which refers to the former Assistance Pension (Pension Asistencial). After the reform, this group received the higher 
PBS (paid to individuals 18 years or older who were PASIS beneficiaries prior to the reform who became PBS 
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percent) of the respondents indicated that they had heard of the pension reform, though more 
(35.3 percent) said they had heard of the PBS for the elderly and 8.6 percent of the top up (APS) 
for the elderly. Very few (3.7 percent) said they had received the pre-2008 reform support 
payment (PASIS) as of June 2008, and about the same fraction (3.6 percent) claimed to be 
receiving the PBS support as of 2009. Very few, only 6.6 percent, knew that the PBS and APS 
benefits began in July 2008, and only 12.5 percent knew that the PBS and APS benefits cover the 
poorest 40-60 percent of the population (with the percentage increasing over time). In summary, 
very few respondents seemed particularly knowledgeable about the 2008 pension reform though 
knowledge about the PBS component was more widespread. 
Table 2 here 
A second set of outcomes, described in Table 3, refers to transfers received by 
households in 2006 and 2009, as well as the difference between these two years. These transfers 
(in constant 2009 US$) are: (a) PASIS/PBS pension payments, (b) the sum of all public transfers 
received, and (c) all private transfers received.13
                                                                                                                                                                                           
beneficiaries automatically as of July 2008). For this reason, when we compare 2006 and 2009 data, we refer to both 
groups. 
 In 2006, the reported average total public 
transfers and private transfers both totaled around US$152, though with much greater variation 
for private transfers received (sd=US$1,332) than for public transfers received (sd=US$484). 
PASIS/PBS accounted for about two-thirds (65 percent in 2006 and 66 percent in 2009) of the 
reported public transfers. Between 2006 and 2009, public transfers rose considerably: the 
average increased by half to US$236 for overall reported public transfers and by 60 percent to 
US$157 for PASIS/PBS. At the same time, mean private transfers declined by 12 percent though 
12 An analysis of pension knowledge using earlier EPS surveys is provided in Behrman et al. (2010). 
13 The sum for all public transfers received includes, in addition to the PASIS/PBS pension payment, the family 
allowance, the Subsidio Unico Familiar (SUF, for recent births, pregnant women, mothers, mental deficiencies, and 
invalids) and other public subsidies. For PASIS/PBS and for total public transfers both the reported amounts and the 
corrected amounts (given the actual schedules) were investigated, but none of the conclusions differ importantly 
between these two alternatives.    
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the change was not significant. Thus, public transfers appear to have risen between 2006 and 
2009, coincident with the pension reform of July 2008. There is also some suggestion of the 
possibility of private transfers being crowded-out. Overall, reported public transfers equaled 2.4 
percent of mean reported income in 2009, while the PASIS/PBS alone accounted for 1.6 percent 
and private transfers received accounted for 1.4 percent. 
Table 3 here  
A third set of outcomes includes economic and social behaviors such as hours worked, 
household expenditures, alcohol and cigarette consumption, health insurance, self-reported 
health status, and ownership of consumer durables. The picture is quite mixed here, since 
between 2006 and 2009, mean household ownership increased significantly for 9 of the 12 
consumer durables considered (the significant decline for landline telephones is offset by the 
large rise in cellphones). On the other hand, mean household per capita food expenditure 
declined significantly by 4 percent; cigarette consumption held steady but reported alcohol 
consumption fell by 15 percent; household per capita clothing expenditures increased 
significantly by 18 percent; and household per capita educational and medicine expenditures 
remained the same. Respondents’ mean participation in private health insurance decreased 
significantly by 7 percent and self-reported health status declined significantly by 2 percent. For 
those employed, mean hours worked remained at about 45 hours per week. 
Table 4 here 
 
Multivariate Analysis of 2008 PBS Reform Impacts on Targeted Poor Households with at 
Least One Member Age 65+ 
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Using the 2006 and 2009 EPSs, we next measure the “intent-to-treat” impacts of the PBS 
component of the 2008 Pension Reform on targeted poor households with at least one member 
age 65+. Our estimation strategy for transfers received and behavioral outcomes exploits 
reported changes between 2006 and 2009, along with discontinuities in the applicability of 
certain provisions of the reform related to the age of household members and the FPS score. We 
also control for observed characteristics unaffected by the program in triple-difference estimates 
(because there are two eligibility criteria plus the time difference between 2006 and 2009). For 
example, to investigate how the PBS transfer influenced an outcome Yt for targeted households, 
we estimate the following model:  
Yit=β0+β1Age65ht + β2Poorht +β3Timet+β4Age65ht*Poorht 
+β5Age65ht*Timet+β6Poorht*Timet +β7Age65ht*Poorht*Timet+ β8Controlsit +vit, , 
where the subscript i refers to the unit of observation for the dependent variable which may be 
either the individual respondent or the household depending on the outcome variable; the 
subscript h refers to the household because some of the right-side variables are household-level 
variables even if the dependent variable is an individual-level variable (in particular Age65 and 
Poor); the subscript t refers to the time period; Age65=1 if the household satisfies the age 
criterion for PBS eligibility (e.g. it has at least one individual age 65+) and zero otherwise; Poor 
= 1 if the household has a “Ficha de Proteccion Social” score below the cutoff and zero 
otherwise;14
                                                          
14 In our empirical implementation we have a measure of Poor only for 2009 so effectively the time subscript for 
this variable is suppressed.  
 and Time = 1 for 2009 (after the introduction of the Reform in 2008) and zero 
otherwise. We also include a vector of characteristics (controls) unaffected by the program (e.g., 
for the household head and respondent depending on whether the dependent variable is 
household-level or respondent-level, sex and a quadratic in age to control for possible life-cycle 
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patterns) and a stochastic random disturbance term v. Our estimate of β7 measures the “intent-to-
treat” impact of the PBS component of the 2008 reform on the dependent variable of interest in 
2009 for targeted poor households with at least one household member age 65+ who meet the 
age and poverty requirements to receive the PBS, holding constant observed household variables 
(and through the triple-difference procedure, unobserved fixed household characteristics).  
Only the 2009 wave contains relevant information for the knowledge of the 2009 pension 
reform and reported receipt of PASIS/PBS transfers. Accordingly, we generate double-difference 
estimates using only the 2009 data; that is, in the equation above, all terms involving Timet are 
constrained to zero (i.e., β3=β5=β6=β7=0) and the estimate of β4 reflects the impact of the PBS 
reform on key outcomes. Again we control for observed household/respondent variables and, 
through the double-difference procedure, unobserved fixed household/respondent characteristics. 
Table 5 summarizes findings for the pension reform knowledge and reports of 
PASIS/PBS transfers. Five of the dependent variables are dichotomous (0 = no; 1 = yes), so 
probit estimates are presented for these variables. Two others are trichotomous (0 = incorrect; 1 
= do not know; 2 = correct), so we use multinomial probits for these (Table 5 presents marginal 
effects). Of key interest is the fact that the linear term for having someone age 65+ in the 
household is statistically significant in only one of the seven outcomes: respondents are 
significantly more likely to say they receive the PBS at the time of the 2009 survey if there is a 
household member age 65+. The linear term for being poor is statistically significant for five of 
the seven dependent variables; it is negative for having heard of the pension reform, having 
heard of the PBS for the elderly, having heard of the APS for the elderly, and not knowing15
                                                          
15 That is, responding they “do not know,” as opposed to responding wrongly or correctly. 
 
when the pension reform began. It is positive for having received the PASIS and having received 
the PBS. Thus, ceteris paribus, the poor are less-well informed than the non-poor but more likely 
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to report receiving the PASIS/PBS targeted transfers. Of most interest are the interaction terms 
between having a person age 65 or older in the household and being poor. Among the seven 
dependent variables examined, only the one for having heard of the PBS for the elderly has a 
positive significant coefficient estimate.   
Table 5 here 
Next we turn to household transfers received, summarized in Table 6. Now the linear 
terms and double interactions for having someone age 65+ in the household, the year 2009, and 
the household being poor, are all positive and significant for all of the public transfers, as well as 
for the PASIS/PBS (with a single exception of the year 2009 variable for the latter). By contrast, 
none of these is significant for receiving private transfers. The coefficient estimate of primary 
interest, of course, is the triple interaction because this estimate gives the estimated average 
impact of the 2008 reform on 2009 outcomes for poor households having someone age 65 or 
older. These estimates are significantly positive and substantial for PASIS/PBS (US$105 per 
year) and for total public transfers received (US$107 per year). The estimate is not statistically 
significant for private transfers received, so there is little evidence of crowding-out of private 
transfers by larger public transfers. 
Table 6 here 
Next we turn to estimated triple-difference impacts on household behaviors. Table 7 
reports estimates on four types of per capita household expenditures (food, clothing, education, 
medicine) and five respondent behaviors (cigarette consumption, alcohol consumption, private 
health insurance purchases, self-rated health status and weekly hours worked), while Table 8 
reports estimates for a dozen purchases of consumer durables/services (TV, refrigerator, washing 
machine, oven, hot water heater, landline phone, cell phone, DVD, microwave, computer, 
11 
 
internet connection, and cable TV). For these estimates, the linear coefficient for having a 
household member age 65+ is significantly negative for household per capita clothing 
expenditures, household per capita educational expenditures, and household ownership of cell 
phones, DVDs, computers, and internet connections. In contrast, the estimates are significantly 
positive for the number of TVs and landline phones, as well as for the highest categories in 
respondent self-rated health. The linear associations with the year 2009 are significantly negative 
with household per capita food expenditures, respondent alcohol consumption, and household 
ownership of landline phones and ovens, and significantly positive for per capita clothing 
expenditures and ownership of washing machines, hot water heaters, cell phones, DVDs, 
microwaves, computers, internet connections and TV cable. The linear associations with being 
poor are significantly negative for per capita food, clothing and educational expenditures, 
cigarettes and alcohol consumption, private health insurance, the highest categories in self-
related health, hours worked per week, and household ownership of eleven consumer durables 
(the exception is ownership of ovens). Accordingly these results are fairly plausible a priori. 
There also are a number of significant double interactions (27 percent of the 63 possibilities) 
summarized in Table 9, about 65 percent of which ameliorate the negative associations of being 
poor for households with a member age 65+ in 2009.   
Tables 7, 8, and 9 here 
For the purpose of evaluating the short-run impact of the reform, the key coefficient 
estimates are those of the triple-difference terms which are positive for three of the four 
household expenditure categories: cigarette consumption; private insurance, and the three highest 
categories in self-reported health status; as well as five of the consumer durable purchase 
amounts. They are negative in other cases with perhaps the most interesting being the fairly large 
12 
 
reduction of 1.6 work hours per week. Thus, there is some suggestion that the PBS impact on 
targeted households may have been to boost expenditures on basic household consumption 
including on health, enhance respondent leisure by reducing hours worked, and improve 
respondent self-reported health, with mixed effects on respondent cigarette versus alcohol intake 
and on the composition of consumer durables. This pattern could be interpreted to be somewhat 
welfare-enhancing for the targeted poor households having an older member in 2009.  
Nevertheless, two important qualifications must be noted. First, with the exception of the 
increase in leisure through hours worked reductions, estimated effects are not quantitatively 
large. For instance, our estimated increase in annual expenditures on food, clothing, and 
medicine, represent only an annual US$13, US$1 and US$16, respectively. Second these 
estimates are not significantly different from zero at the standard 5 percent level; the two most 
significant coefficient estimates are for (a) respondent self-reported health status (significantly 
nonzero at the 10 percent level) and (b) hours worked per week (significantly nonzero at the 15 
percent level). 
 
Conclusions 
Our study is the first systematic effort to directly evaluate the short-run impacts of 
Chile’s pension reform of 2008. We focus on a key component, the Basic Solidarity Pension or 
PBS for the elderly, directed towards poor households with at least one person age 65+. We find 
that, in 2009, the poor were less-well informed about the reform than the non-poor, but they were 
nevertheless more likely to report receiving the PASIS/PBS transfers targeted on the poor. One 
significant program impact is that respondents living in a poor household with someone age 65+ 
are more likely than others to have heard of the PBS for the elderly. We find a significant 
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positive impact of the reform among the targeted poor having an older household member where 
respondents indicate receiving an annual US$105from PASIS/PBS transfers. There is little 
evidence of public benefits crowding-out private transfers. There is also some suggestion that the 
targeted transfers led households to boost expenditures on health, increase leisure, and improve 
self-reported health, with mixed effects on cigarette versus alcohol intake and on the composition 
of consumer durables.  
This pattern might seem to be somewhat welfare-enhancing for poor households with at 
least one older member in 2009. Nevertheless, such a conclusion must be heavily qualified 
because, with the exception of the reduction in work hours of 1.6 hours per week, the estimated 
effects are small and none of the underlying coefficient estimates are significantly nonzero at the 
standard 5 percent level. These insignificant and generally small effects raise questions about 
what happened to the reported increased income from the increased PASIS/PBS as well as 
questions about how these impact patterns will evolve. Part of the answer, despite the impression 
of the estimates, may be in crowding-out private transfers received and inducing reductions in 
work. As has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Behrman and King 2008; King and Behrman 2009), 
there also are a number of reasons to expect adjustments over time in implementation of reforms 
and in private responses to those reforms.16
                                                          
16 A related observation in term often used in the ‘impact evaluation’ literature is that we are estimating “intent to 
treat” effects. But if there are implementation delays, the “intent to treat” group may be much larger than the 
“treatment of the treated” group, initially, even if eventually they become approximately the same over time.  
 Therefore, it will be very important, in the future, to 
monitor and evaluate the time pattern of a broad array of responses to the components of the 
Reform introduced in 2008, as well as to the components of the Reform being phased in over 
time. 
14 
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Mean Sd. Dev.
Schooling attainment (grade) 9.8 4.3
Age (years) 49.7 14.9
Male (%) 48.5
Household Characteristics
Number of members 3.9 1.9
One or more member >= 65 years (%) 32.0
HH head schooling attainment (grades) 9.3 4.4
HH head age (years) 53.8 14.6
HH head male (%) 72.9
Income (2009 USD) 9,657 14,087
Income per capita (2009 USD) 2,994 4,475
Income missing (%) 21.2
Poor based on FPS score (%) 52.7
Notes: N = 10,394 except for household income and household income per
capita for which cases N = 8,195. FPS stands for Ficha de Proteccion Social .
Respondent Characteristics
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Controls and Selected Other Variables 
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Have you heard 
about the Pension 
Reform?
Do you know or have 
you heard about the 
Basic Pension 
System (PBS) for 
the Elderly?
Do you know or have 
you heard of the 
Pension 
Contribution 
System (APS) for 
the Elderly?
By June 2008, 
Were you a 
beneficiary of the 
Support Pension 
PASIS?
Currently, are you 
receiving the Basic 
Pension System 
(PBS)?
No (% ) 74.1 64.75 91.42 96.31 96.44
Yes (% ) 25.9 35.25 8.58 3.69 3.56
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Incorrect (% )
DNK / NR (% )
Correct (% )
Total
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for 2009 Knowledge of the Pension Reform and Reporting Receiving PASIS/PBS Transfers
Since when do you think the people will 
receive the benefits of the Basic Pension 
System (PBS) and the Pension 
Contribution System (APS)? /a
What percentage of the population in the 
country do you believe will receive the 
benefits of the Basic Pension System 
(PBS) and Pension Contribution System 
(APS)? /b
Notes: N = 10,394. /a correct = July 2008; /b correct = 40-60%.
20.69
100
21.4
66.12
12.49
72.72
6.6
100
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Mean Sd. Dev.
%  HHs that 
receive the 
transfer
Mean Sd. Dev.
%  HHs that 
receive the 
transfer
2009 - 2006 p-value
151.8 483.6 28.8 235.8 603.2 35.5 84.1 0.000
PASIS/PBS transfer 98.1 457.4 7.0 156.6 571.1 9.7 58.5 0.000
151.7 1,332.2 7.3 133.6 1,127.7 6.8 -18.0 0.292
Note: N = 10,394 each year. 
Total private transfers received
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Annual Transfers Received by Households (in 2009 US$) 
Difference in means
2006 2009
Total public transfers received
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Mean Sd. Dev. Mean Sd. Dev. 2009 - 2006 p-value
Food 741 867 711 550 -29 0.004
Education 341 916 328 875 -14 0.266
Clothing 85 267 100 179 15 0.000
Medicine 87 932 89 916 2 0.863
TV 1.83 1.05 1.88 1.02 0.05 0.000
Refrigerator 0.96 0.36 0.97 0.32 0.00 0.509
Washing machine 0.74 0.47 0.79 0.43 0.06 0.000
Oven 1.01 0.25 1.00 0.22 -0.01 0.000
Hot water heater 0.67 0.51 0.69 0.51 0.02 0.013
Landline phone 0.55 0.58 0.53 0.57 -0.03 0.001
Cell phone 1.46 1.36 1.68 1.32 0.22 0.000
DVD 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.68 0.03 0.001
Microwave 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.06 0.000
Computer 0.38 0.58 0.50 0.66 0.12 0.000
Internet connection 0.17 0.39 0.28 0.48 0.11 0.000
Cable TV 0.25 0.46 0.38 0.51 0.13 0.000
Number of cigarettes smoked per month 47.0 116.6 47.4 120.3 0.5 0.778
Number of glasses of alcohol consumed per week 2.3 5.3 2.0 4.7 -0.4 0.000
Health insurance is private (%) 13 12 -1 0.048
Self-reported health status (1=very bad; 6=excellent) 3.7 1.0 3.7 0.9 -0.1 0.000
Hours worked (weekly) 45.1 13.2 44.8 13.1 -0.4 0.141
Note: N=10,394 each year except: data on per capita household expenditures on clothing N= 10,099; per capita household medicine expenditures N=9,735;
purchasing private medical insurance N= 9,737; hours worked N = 5,980; and for the 12 consumer durables and services N ranges from 10,388 to 10,394.
2006 2009 Difference in Means
Annual household expenditures per capita (constant 2009 USD)
Household consumer durables and services (number)
Respondent
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for Household and Respondent Behavioral Outcomes
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Have you 
heard about 
the pension 
reform?
Do you know 
or have you 
heard about 
the Basic 
Pension 
System for 
the Elderly?
Do you know 
or have you 
heard of the 
Pension 
Contribution 
System for 
the Elderly?
By June 
2008, Were 
you a 
beneficiary of 
the Support 
Pension 
PASIS?
Currently, 
are you 
receiving the 
Basic 
Pension 
System?
outcome = 
incorrect
outcome = 
DNK / NR
outcome = 
correct
outcome = 
incorrect
outcome = 
DNK / NR
outcome = 
correct
HH member >= age 65 0.023 0.016 -0.002 0.011 0.029* 0.011 -0.038 0.027 0.029 -0.030 0.001
Poor -0.081*** -0.063*** -0.023* 0.021*** 0.026** -0.029* 0.030 -0.001 -0.020 0.021 -0.002
Poor * HH member >= age 65 -0.012 .0624381* 0.007 0.008 -0.004 0.004 0.007 -0.011 -0.030 0.025 0.004
Notes: N = 10,394; additional dummies included but not reported are: 1 if household did not apply for poverty score, 1 if do not know if household applied for poverty score and two interactions between
the previous two variables and HH member >= 65y. Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff). Also, respondent's age, age squared and gender included as controls.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Double interactions
Linear terms
Table 5. Knowledge of the Pension Reform and Reporting Receiving PASIS/PBS Transfers - Marginal effects
Since when do you think the people will 
receive the benefits of the Basic Pension 
System and the Pension Contribution 
System?
What percentage of the population in the 
country do you  believe will apply the 
benefits of the Basic Pension System and 
Pension Contribution System?
0 = no; 1 = yes
probit              multinomial probit
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All Public 
Transfers
 PASIS/ PBS All  Private 
Transfers
HH member >= age 65 52.03** 42.81* 23.44
Year 2009 17.93*** 2.87 -9.96
Poor 84.56*** 33.77*** 17.57
HH member >= age 65 * Year 2009 60.99** 67.80** 3.58
Poor * HH member >= age 65 113.82*** 132.29*** -45.39
Poor * Year 2009 45.78** 20.79** -13.41
Year 2009 * Poor * HH member >= age 65 106.89** 104.85** -28.98
Notes: N = 20,788 (10,394 respondents each year). Reference category is non-poor (poverty
score above the cutoff) + household did not apply for poverty score + do not know if
household applied for poverty score. HH head's age, age squared and gender included as
controls.
Table 6. Annual Transfers Received by Households in 2009 US$
Linear terms
Double interactions
Triple interactions
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Health 
insurance, 
probit 
marginal 
effects
0=public; 
1=private
outcome = 
very bad
outcome = 
bad
outcome = 
reasonable
outcome = 
good
outcome = 
very good
outcome = 
excellent
HH member >= age 65 -10.66 -221.38*** -23.03** 5.66 -3.53 0.24 -0.01 -0.001* -0.008* -0.02* 0.014* 0.009* 0.006* -0.91
Year 2009 -41.20* -27.81 30.47*** 16.25 1.97 -0.39*** -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.27
Poor -310.68*** -297.26*** -62.11*** -52.68 -8.13** -0.42*** -0.18*** 0.006*** 0.04*** 0.088*** -0.065*** -0.041*** -0.029*** -1.1**
HH member >= age 65 * Year 2009 -18.27 24.18 -12.56 -17.48 -0.22 0.05 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013 -0.010 -0.006 -0.004 0.84
Poor * HH member >= age 65 6.56 171.39*** 24.66** -3.90 0.49 -0.11 0.035* 0.001 0.004 0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 0.51
Poor * Year 2009 20.99 21.82 -18.24* -23.84 -1.53 0.25 -0.012* 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.23
Year 2009 * Poor * HH member >= age 65 13.18 -4.50 0.70 15.85 4.38 -0.01 0.005 -0.001 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -1.62
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: N = 20,788 (10,394 respondents each year) except data on per capita household expenditures on clothing N= 10,099; per capita household medicine expenditures N=9,735; purchasing private medical insurance
N= 9,737; and hours worked N = 5,980. Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff) + household did not apply for poverty score + do not know if household applied for poverty score. HH head's
age, age squared and gender included as controls in expenditures regressions and respondent's age, age squared and gender included in behavior regressions.
Number  
glasses of 
alcohol per 
week 
(OLS)
Self-reported health status, ordered probit marginal effects Hours 
worked 
weekly 
(OLS)
Linear terms
Double interactions
Triple interactions
Food 
(OLS)
Education 
(OLS)
Clothing 
(OLS)
Medicine 
(OLS)
Number 
cigarettes  
per month 
(OLS)
Table 7. Household Annual Expenditures and Respondent Behaviors
Annual Household Per Capita Expenditures 
(2009 USD) 
Respondent Behaviors
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TV Refrigerator Washing 
Machine
Oven Hot Water 
Heater
Landline 
Phone
Cell Phone DVD Microwave Computer Internet 
Connection
Cable TV
HH member >= age 65 0.081* 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.049* -0.307*** -0.068** -0.01 -0.074*** -0.036* 0.03
Year 2009 0.03 -0.01 0.036*** -0.014** 0.019** -0.066*** 0.130*** 0.043** 0.064*** 0.152*** 0.159*** 0.148***
Poor -0.461*** -0.089*** -0.177*** -0.01 -0.276*** -0.294*** -0.463*** -0.2612*** -0.242*** -0.351*** -0.221*** -0.216***
HH member >= age 65 * Year 2009 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.114* 0.01 -0.02 -0.064** -0.036* -0.042*
Poor * HH member >= age 65 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.116* 0.01 0.02 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.00
Poor * Year 2009 0.03 0.024** 0.034** 0.00 0.00 0.049*** 0.156*** -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.056*** -0.01
Year 2009 * Poor * HH member >= age 65 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Notes: N ranges from 10,388 to 10,394 respondents each year. Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff) + household did not apply for poverty score + do not know if household applied for poverty
score. HH head's age, age squared and gender included as controls.
How many of the following devices do you 
have in your household?
Table 8.  OLS Estimates for Household Durable
Linear terms
Double interactions
Triple interactions
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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HH member >= age 65 Year 2009 Poor HH member >= age 65 Poor Year 2009
positive negative positive negative positive negative
cell phone computer clothing refrigerator clothing
internet education washer internet
cable TV cell phone land phone private health insurance
computer cell phone
internet
private health insurance
Table 9.  Signs of Significant Associations of Interactions for Behavioral Outcomes
Note: Based on Tables 7 and 8. Except for private health insurance, these all are household level outcomes.
Interaction between Interaction between Interaction between
 
 
 
